David Foster Wallace on the Good Life by Ballantyne, Nathan & Tosi, Justin
Dostoevsky wrote Ϯction about the stuϸ that’s really important. 
He wrote Ϯction about identity, moral value, death, will, sexual vs. 
spiritual love, greed, freedom, obsession, reason, faith, suicide. And 
he did it without ever reducing his characters to mouthpieces or 
his books to tracts. His concern was always what it is to be a human 
being—that is, how to be an actual person, someone whose life is 
informed by values and principles, instead of just an especially 
shrewd kind of self-preserving animal.
—DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, “JOSEPH FRANK’S DOSTOEVSKY”
d avid Foster Wallace thought that the point of writ-ing Ϯction was to explore what it is to be a human being.1 In this essay, we argue that his writings 
suggest a view about what philosophers would call the good life. 
Wallace’s perspective is subtle and worthy of attention. We’ll con-
trast what Wallace says with some popular positions from moral 
philosophy and contemporary culture.
Wallace said much about ethical matters even though he didn’t 
write on them formally or systematically. How then shall we dis-
till views from his writings? Our strategy is to present Wallace’s 
reactions, as found in his Ϯction and some essays, to three positions 
about the good life. We will ask what Wallace would make of those 
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positions and thus try to triangulate his own view by reference 
to them.
The Ϯrst position we’ll explore is sometimes called ironism. 
More often practiced than defended, for reasons that will be evi-
dent, ironism involves distancing oneself from everything one 
says or does and putting on what Wallace often calls a “mask of 
ennui.” Ironism appeals to us, Wallace thought, because it insu-
lates us from criticism, both from others and from ourselves. 
After all, if someone dismisses what she does as unimportant 
or even meaningless, she can hardly be criticized for valuing it 
too much. But such a person can be criticized for failing to value 
anything, and this is Wallace’s response to the ironist. Wallace 
thinks that our lives should be about something. He underlines 
the value of sincere self-identiϮcation with what one does and 
cares about.
According to a second kind of position, what philosophers call 
hedonism, a good life consists in pleasure. Wallace would reject 
any form of hedonism, we surmise, because he doubts that plea-
sure could play such a fundamental role in the good life. A life of 
enjoyment is a life of private enjoyment, and we mangle values 
like friendship by explaining their value solely in terms of our 
pleasure. A good human life involves a richer assortment of goods 
than these theories capture.
On a third family of views—narrative theories, as we’ll call 
them—a good human life is characterized by Ϯdelity to a uniϮed 
narrative. This is a systematic story about one’s life, composed of 
a set of ends or principles according to which one lives. The story 
lays down the terms of success for a good life. Failing to live up 
to the story means failing to ϰourish. But Wallace’s Ϯction is rife 
with characters who are unhappy at least partly because they try 
(and fail) to live up to their stories. Narrative theories, he thinks, 
turn people into spectators to, rather than participants in, their 
own lives.
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We conclude that Wallace sees serious ϰaws in these three pop-
ular views. But Wallace also suggests an attractive method for pur-
suing moral questions. Not unlike Wittgenstein, Wallace thought 
his task was to prevent people from being distracted by pseudo-
problems in thinking. In Wallace’s view, the point of theorizing is 
to solve actual human problems. But he also oϸers clear propos-
als about the content of a good life. The primary elements of the 
view on oϸer in Wallace’s writing are these. A meaningful human 
life need not be special; it need not be characterized by commit-
ment to values or projects that are unique, unusual, or extreme. 
There is value in ordinary, everyday, and even seemingly banal 
experiences. But is there a theory behind all this? What makes 
these things good for us? Where does his rejection of other theo-
ries leave him? And, according to him, are there facts of the mat-
ter about human well-being, such that someone could be mistaken 
about what makes her life go well? Our reading of Wallace will 
begin to sketch answers to these and other questions.
WALLACE ON IRONISM
In his 1993 essay “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” 
Wallace argues that “irony tyrannizes us.”2 As Wallace traces 
irony’s recent history in America, it gained popularity as a cul-
tural tool for exposing hypocrisy. Irony can purport to show, for 
example, that institutions commonly promote absurdly ideal-
ized images of themselves, that people’s claims to represent the 
interests of others are often self-seeking ploys, and that many tra-
ditionally held values are in tension. Irony began its recent popu-
larity as an avant-garde liberator. Later on, says Wallace, it became 
a culturally entrenched source of unhappiness.
What has this to do with the good life? Wallace sees the per-
vasiveness of irony in contemporary culture through its impact 
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on television programming. The entertainment industry—one of 
the early targets of (ironic) postmodern cultural criticism—has 
hoisted irony’s banner. Ironic humor became a staple of television 
because the market demands it. One of Wallace’s examples here is 
late-night host David Letterman, the “archangel” of contemporary 
irony. In an interview Wallace remarked: “The particular kind of 
irony I’m talking about when Letterman comes out and says, ‘What 
a Ϯne crowd,’ and everybody roars with laughter, came about in the 
60s.”3 Wallace argued that irony and self-consciousness had served 
crucial and valuable purposes but that “their aesthetic’s absorp-
tion by U.S. commercial culture has had appalling consequences 
for writers and everyone else.”4 Viewers enjoy ironic humor about 
news, gossip, and the like, we surmise, because they understand 
the ironic point of view, appreciate its presuppositions, regard 
ironic treatments of various topics as appropriate and smart. In 
short, viewers think ironically themselves. Or at least aspire to.
But irony is a source of unhappiness, thinks Wallace. Why? And 
how does irony attract us while making us unhappy? Here’s an 
extended passage from InϮnite Jest on the loneliness of teenaged 
Hal Incandenza:
It’s of some interest that the lively arts of the millennial U.S.A. 
treat anhedonia and internal emptiness as hip and cool. It’s 
maybe the vestiges of the Romantic gloriϮcation of Weltschmerz, 
which means world-weariness or hip ennui. Maybe it’s the fact 
that most of the arts here are produced by world-weary and 
sophisticated older people and then consumed by younger peo-
ple who not only consume art but study it for clues on how to be 
cool, hip—and keep in mind that, for kids and younger people, 
to be hip and cool is the same as to be admired and accepted 
and included and so Unalone. Forget so-called peer-pressure. 
It’s more like peer-hunger. No? We enter a spiritual puberty 
where we snap to the fact that the great transcendent horror is 
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loneliness, excluded encagement in the self. Once we’ve hit this 
age, we will now give or take anything, wear any mask, to Ϯt, 
be part-of, not be Alone, we young. The U.S. arts are our guide 
to inclusion. A how-to. We are shown how to fashion masks of 
ennui and jaded irony at a young age where the face is Ϯctile 
enough to assume the shape of whatever it wears. And then it’s 
stuck there, the weary cynicism that saves us from gooey senti-
ment and unsophisticated naïveté. Sentiment equals naïveté on 
this continent.5
Irony is appealing, then, not only because adopting an ironic 
attitude lets us Ϯt in and feel less alone. We also get to present 
ourselves as being savvy—knowingly bored with the sentimen-
tal banalities that others mistakenly value. The mask of ennui we 
present to others proves we at least aren’t naïve.
Wallace goes on to explain why this ironic stance makes us 
unhappy:
Hal, who’s empty but not dumb, theorizes privately that what 
passes for hip cynical transcendence of sentiment is really some 
kind of fear of being really human, since to be really human 
(at least as he conceptualizes it) is probably to be unavoidably 
sentimental and naïve and goo-prone and generally pathetic, is 
to be in some basic interior way forever infantile, some sort 
of not-quite-right-looking infant dragging itself anaclitically 
around the map, with big wet eyes and froggy-soft skin, huge 
skull, gooey drool. One of the really American things about Hal, 
probably, is the way he despises what it is he’s really lonely for: 
this hideous internal self, incontinent of sentiment and need, that 
pules and writhes just under the hip empty mask, anhedonia.6
Wallace’s insight on irony is this: when worn as a mask, irony 
helps one cast a striking Ϯgure, but it is privately, personally 
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destructive. It prevents us from doing what human nature pushes 
us to do: to care about things sincerely and to pursue what we 
care about. Once in the grip of irony, we are so afraid of appear-
ing really to value things that we turn ironic to the core. We don’t 
value anything at all. Irony is, Wallace writes, “not a rhetorical 
mode that wears well.¬.¬.¬. This is because irony, entertaining as it 
is, serves an almost exclusively negative function. It’s critical and 
destructive, a ground-clearing.¬.¬.¬. But irony’s singularly unuseful 
when it comes to constructing anything to replace the hypocrisies 
it debunks.”7 It leaves human beings empty and isolated, with no 
way to improve their situation—aside from subjecting themselves 
to ironic criticism.
Another observer, Richard Rorty, once set down a statement of 
just the sort of thing Wallace described.8 Rorty writes:
All human beings carry about a set of words which they employ 
to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are 
the words in which we formulate praise of our friends and 
contempt for our enemies, our long-term projects, our deep-
est self-doubts and our highest hopes. They are the words in 
which we tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes retro-
spectively, the story of our lives. I shall call these words a person’s 
“Ϯnal vocabulary.”9
With that terminology in hand, Rorty continues:
I shall deϮne an “ironist” as someone who fulϮlls three condi-
tions: (1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the Ϯnal 
vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed 
by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as Ϯnal by people 
or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument 
phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor 
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dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about 
her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer 
to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not 
herself.10
Insofar as Rorty’s ironist can be committed to valuing any-
thing, it is only in a weak sense. The ironist seriously doubts that 
what she values is really important. Her commitment won’t with-
stand criticism from anyone who rejects it. To defend against 
such criticism, the ironist has two options. She might shoot back 
at her critic, charging that he’s simply foisting his values on oth-
ers, as he can’t defend his values from outside criticism either. 
Or the ironist might instead distance herself from the thing she 
values, confessing that it’s not valuable.
But Rorty manages to stay upbeat about the ironist’s stance. 
Rorty argues that a society of ironists can remain committed to 
humane values by distinguishing between public and private 
justiϮcation. In Rorty’s society of ironists, people “would feel no 
more need to answer the questions ‘Why are you a liberal? Why 
do you care about the humiliation of strangers?’ than the aver-
age sixteenth-century Christian felt to answer the question ‘Why 
are you a Christian?’೒”11 But ironists’ private stance is another 
matter. They are “never quite able to take themselves seriously 
because [they are] always aware that the terms in which they 
describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the 
contingency and fragility of their Ϯnal vocabularies, and thus of 
their selves.”12
It’s important to see a diϸerence between Rorty’s ironist and 
Wallace’s. The Rortean ironist is “impressed by other vocabular-
ies” and thus seems to have some basis for her ironic intellectual 
stance. But Wallace’s ironist isn’t intellectually motivated and, 
if anything, goes in for ironism because of a desire to be beyond 
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criticism, to be cool. Of course, these approaches to ironism aren’t 
incompatible. Nevertheless, Wallace would not be satisϮed with 
Rorty’s positive take on ironism. How we feel about ourselves and 
our values matters. Hal is not leading a good life. Rorty would point 
out that Hal can remain publicly committed to caring about the 
suϸering of others. But this is of no consolation to Hal. His private 
emptiness is a form of suϸering, too.
Though irony once had a purpose, Wallace thinks, it became a 
source of the kind of cruelty it earlier undermined. Wallace’s spec-
ulation on possible means of irony’s removal oϸers further insight 
into his views about the good life:
The next real literary “rebels” in this country might well emerge 
as some weird bunch of anti-rebels, born oglers who dare some-
how to back away from ironic watching, who have the childish 
gall actually to endorse and instantiate single-entendre princi-
ples. Who treat of plain old untrendy human troubles and emo-
tions in U.S. life with reverence and conviction. Who eschew 
self-consciousness and hip fatigue. These anti-rebels would be 
outdated, of course, before they even started. Dead on the page. 
Too sincere. Clearly repressed. Backward, quaint, naïve, anachro-
nistic. Maybe that’ll be the point. Maybe that’s why they’ll be the 
next real rebels. Real rebels, as far as I can see, risk disapproval. 
The old postmodern insurgents risked the gasp and squeal: shock, 
disgust, outrage, censorship, accusations of socialism, anarchism, 
nihilism. Today’s risks are diϸerent. The new rebels might be art-
ists willing to risk the yawn, the rolled eyes, the cool smile, the 
nudged ribs, the parody of gifted ironists, the “Oh how banal.” To 
risk accusations of sentimentality, melodrama. Of overcredulity. 
Of softness. Of willingness to be suckered by a world of lurkers 
and starers who fear gaze and ridicule above imprisonment with-
out law.13
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Wallace clearly thinks that a good life is one of sincere, unironic 
commitment. But the nature of the commitment and its relation-
ship to value remain unclear. Let’s turn to some other thoughts 
about the good life to look for Wallace’s own view.
WALLACE ON HEDONISM
The upshot of the previous section is that Wallace regards sincere 
commitment to a set of values as a necessary condition for a good 
human life.
What particular values might someone be sincerely committed 
to? For starters, whatever is valuable makes a life go well. Every-
one will grant that things like food, shelter, and good books can be 
valuable when they are a means to some further value. But what’s 
ultimately, noninstrumentally valuable? What is good in and of 
itself? Unsurprisingly, there is no agreement among philosophers, 
here as elsewhere.14 One perennial answer, endorsed by thinkers 
from Epicurus to Jeremy Bentham, is called value hedonism. The 
basic idea is that having pleasure is what makes life go well.15
What would Wallace make of value hedonism? He would be 
unequivocally hostile to one brand of hedonism, it seems. Some 
hedonists say that pleasure is a favorable attitude toward an expe-
rienced state of aϸairs. According to these theorists, what makes 
pleasure valuable is not the feeling or sensation itself, but our enjoy-
ment of the sensation. It’s the attitude of enjoyment that is crucial. 
That attitude, say these theorists, is what has value. By contrast, 
other hedonists think of pleasure purely as a sensation. They say that 
the valuable thing about pleasure is the sensation itself—immediate 
sensory experiences themselves are good. On this understanding of 
pleasure, someone may enjoy some experience of hers, but it’s not 
her enjoyment of the experience that gives it value.
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Wallace sees pleasure-as-mere-sensation hedonism as an unac-
ceptably narrow account of the good human life. Consider InϮnite 
Jest, in which several characters become Ϯxated on the Ϯlm of 
the same title. Watching that Ϯlm is so blissful that viewers can’t 
tear themselves away, and they eventually die after ignoring all 
other areas of life. Wallace’s case is complicated.16 Yet surely these 
characters, whatever else we say about them, are not ϰourish-
ing human beings—even though they satisfy the requirements 
for ϰourishing set down by the version of hedonism at issue. 
Or consider what Wallace says in his essay about a seven-night 
luxury Caribbean cruise: he reϰects on the “Insatiable Infant” 
part of himself, the part that “WANTS” felt pleasure. The “big lie” 
of the luxury cruise, Wallace tells us, is that this infantile part 
can be Ϯnally put to rest by total, perfectly delivered pampering 
and pleasure. That’s a lie because trying to satisfy this infant is 
impossible—“its whole essence or dasein or whatever lies in its a 
priori insatiability.”17
But here’s a perhaps more straightforward example, drawn 
from InϮnite Jest. Prince Q—, the Saudi Minister of Home Enter-
tainment, organizes his life around eating the freshest available 
T|blerone chocolate bars in immense quantities. The prince’s 
chocolate habit badly imbalances his diet, and he employs a medi-
cal attaché to relieve the suϸering his diet causes, allowing him to 
continue eating. The case is amusing, in a way, because the attaché 
is hired not to treat the addiction but to enable the prince’s absurd 
and unhealthy habit.18
One potential reaction to this case—one suggested by pleasure-
as-mere-sensation hedonism—is to wish that Prince Q— didn’t 
need to endure such maxillofacial suϸering to reach chocolaty 
bliss. But of course this response misses the point. What’s sad here 
is not only the lengths the prince goes to get pleasure but the nar-
rowness of his life. The problem is not that he doesn’t have enough 
pleasure in life. It’s that he has nothing else. His life is about the 
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wrong thing, we think Wallace would say, and so any theory that 
implies that such a life of pleasure goes well can’t be correct.
But Wallace might still seriously entertain other forms of hedo-
nism. What the remaining views share is simple: they allow that 
the content of well-being is, somehow, “up to us.” Hedonism says 
it’s pleasure that matters. On this view, value is “nonobjective,” 
in the sense that what is valuable is determined by how we feel 
rather than by facts independent of how we feel.19
Could Wallace endorse some version of hedonism? There’s at 
least some evidence that he could be friendly to such a view. Fol-
lowing his takedown of ironism in “E Unibus Pluram,” he privately 
expressed interest in the idea that people “construct” value. 
D.¬ T. Max calls attention to a snippet from Wallace’s notebook: 
“Hyperc[onsciousness] makes life meaningless [.¬ .¬ .]: but what 
of will to construct OWN meaning? Not the world that gives us 
meaning but vice versa? Dost[oevski] embodies this—Ellis, Leyner, 
Leavitt, Franzen, Powers—they do not. Their Ϯctions reduce to 
complaints and self-pity.”20
Wallace greatly admired Dostoevsky’s boldness in constructing 
meaning.21 To construct meaning, let’s say, is to produce a kind 
of value where once there was none. Hedonism suggests a way in 
which we might produce value: when someone Ϯnds pleasure in 
something, it becomes valuable for her, even if no one previously 
found pleasure in it and it was thus never valuable before.
We suspect Wallace would agree that some versions of hedo-
nism capture something important. They avoid the ironist’s error 
of never taking herself seriously. In fact, if people do not regard 
themselves as valuable—indeed, as sources of value—they couldn’t 
care about enjoying anything in the Ϯrst place. And so hedonism 
implies that ironism is false. That’s a promising start.
Although Wallace would laud value hedonists for sticking out 
their necks and saying that life should be about something, he 
nevertheless expresses deep worries about the role of pleasure in 
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a good life. Consider a series of questions from his “Joseph Frank’s 
Dostoevsky”:22
Is the real point of my life simply to undergo as little pain and as 
much pleasure as possible? My behavior sure seems to indicate 
that this is what I believe, at least a lot of the time. But isn’t this 
kind of a selϮsh way to live? Forget selϮsh—isn’t it awful lonely? 
.¬.¬. But if I decide to decide there’s a diϸerent, less selϮsh, less 
lonely point to my life, won’t the reason for this decision be 
my desire to be less lonely, meaning to suϸer less overall pain? 
Can the decision to be less selϮsh ever be anything other than 
a selϮsh decision?23
Wallace wonders here whether hedonism is avoidable as a 
psychological doctrine—after all, we can always describe the 
motivation for an action in terms of its expected utility for the 
actor. But the element of this passage we want to underline is 
Wallace’s recognition that, fully bracketing the apparent selϮsh-
ness involved in a life of pursuing one’s desires, such a life just 
seems sad. Not only would we say that such a person is selϮsh, 
but we’d say that they miss something important about life.
Hedonism grants the individual a kind of license or control over 
the content of a good life. Yet these views lead to an impoverished 
account of why the chosen content is valuable. Wallace says that life 
thus described sounds “lonely.” We surmise he means that it oϸers a 
sad description of states of aϸairs involving other people. On these 
theories, other people are no more than mere objects in the state of 
aϸairs you value. If a friend is valuable to you, why is that? Well, 
she’s valuable because of the pleasure she brings you or the pain 
she helps you avoid. A friend can be no more than an instrument 
for your purposes, with respect to matters of value. Unsurprisingly, 
Wallace thinks this description of friendship seems lonely.
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Hedonists won’t give up so easily. They may insist that Wal-
lace is confused about their position—it tells us what is good for 
a particular human being. And surely, they’ll reply, other people 
are only good for someone to the extent that others serve as useful 
objects in beneϮcial states of aϸairs. Fair enough. But Wallace sug-
gests an explanation for any appeal of this reply.
Everything in my own immediate experience supports my deep 
belief that I am the absolute center of the universe, the realest, 
most vivid and important person in existence. We rarely think 
about this sort of natural, basic self-centeredness, because it’s 
so socially repulsive, but it’s pretty much the same for all of us, 
deep down. It is our default setting, hardwired into our boards 
at birth. Think about it: there is no experience you have had that 
you are not the absolute center of. The world as you experience 
it is there in front of you or behind you, to the left or right of 
you, on your TV, or your monitor, or whatever. Other people’s 
thoughts and feelings have to be communicated to you some-
how, but your own are so immediate, urgent, real. You get the 
idea. But please don’t worry that I’m getting ready to preach 
to you about compassion or other-directedness or all the so-
called “virtues.” This is not a matter of virtue—it’s a matter of 
my choosing to do the work of somehow altering or getting free 
of my natural, hardwired default setting which is to be deeply 
and literally self-centered, and to see and interpret everything 
through this lens of self.24
Wallace thinks that we should reject this way of thinking of the 
good life. It seems selϮsh, to be sure,25 but his point is diϸerent: 
our own natural self-centeredness leads us to misunderstand our 
own good. We confuse the immediacy of our subjective experience 
with its importance.
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If our native viewpoint easily confuses us about what’s impor-
tant, what can be done? Is there another perspective that allows us 
to think more clearly about value? We will consider one important 
possibility next.
WALLACE ON NARRATIVE THEORIES OF THE GOOD LIFE
Although Wallace was at least attracted to the idea that we some-
how “construct” values that contribute to well-being, hedonism 
won’t Ϯt with his thinking. But there are other ways we might 
“construct” the content of the good life for ourselves. One family 
of views is so-called narrative theories of the good life. Galen Straw-
son sums up the core of these theories as follows: “a richly narra-
tive outlook on one’s life is essential to living well.”26 The basic idea 
is that someone has a good life only if she has a narrative outlook 
on her life. To use ordinary terms, she must see her life as making 
sense as a single story in which she is the main character. Straw-
son’s summing up leaves room for elaboration, and the details are 
Ϯlled in variously by diϸerent theorists. Narrative theories have 
enjoyed some popularity among contemporary philosophers, and 
prominent advocates include Christine Korsgaard, Charles Taylor, 
and J. David Velleman.27
All narrative theorists aϲrm that having a narrative is a neces-
sary condition for a good life. We’ll call this the “weak” thesis. But 
some theorists also endorse a more controversial thesis accord-
ing to which a person simply is the thing described by a narrative. 
This “strong” thesis happens to imply the weak thesis, but the 
latter doesn’t imply the former.28 We will Ϯrst discuss the weak 
thesis before we explain how the strong thesis plays a role in one 
defense of narrative theories.
Narrative theories, like hedonism, allow the content of 
someone’s good to be determined by particular features of her 
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psychology. Consider how narrative theories leave value “up to 
us” in a sense while avoiding some pitfalls of hedonism. For one 
thing, the value of elements within our stories may depend on 
various propositional attitudes, and those are certainly not limited 
to the attitude of enjoyment. For another, the potential roles of 
persons—ourselves included—within our stories is less restrictive. 
On narrative theories, persons are characters just as in literature, 
playing far more nuanced roles than self as enjoyer-of-states-
of-aϸairs or friend as instrument-in-bringing-about-enjoyable-
states-of-aϸairs. Hedonism would seem to recommend analyzing 
all roles in those limited ways.
Here are two further advantages that narrative theories may 
enjoy over hedonism. First, narrative theories better capture the 
richness of human lives and the distinctive value of our long-term 
projects. For instance, we care about being loving parents, faith-
ful friends, about the success of our work, and so on. Narrative 
theories allow for a clear divide between these important projects 
and ephemeral ones. How well our lives go depends on those sig-
niϮcant projects, not on whether we clip our Ϯngernails perfectly. 
Life goes no worse for us, not one bit, when we don’t clip our nails 
right. But, arguably, hedonism must count a poor nail-clipping job 
as relevant to how our lives go, insofar as such events have some 
slight impact on our enjoyment. Second, narratives can focus 
attention in morally signiϮcant ways. A person may regard being 
a faithful friend as an element of her own good, and think that 
this part of her story is more important than whether she always 
gets her way in small or trivial matters. So, narratives can redirect 
our thoughts away from the ϰow of our Ϯrst-person experience, 
precisely as Wallace counsels in This Is Water. Stories can guard us 
against being enslaved by our immediate inclinations.
Parts of This Is Water seem to suggest that Wallace may Ϯnd 
something to like about narrative theories. One commentator on 
Wallace’s ethical thought has argued that Wallace appreciated “the 
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importance of the direction of attention, and the terms in which 
we choose to conceive of situations, in our moral lives.”29 Our petty 
frustration in rush-hour traϲc or in a supermarket checkout line 
may be managed, Wallace thinks, with help from imaginative sto-
rytelling. Telling stories about the meaning of commonplace situ-
ations may help us overcome our self-centered perspective: we 
need a narrative that will sympathetically reveal to us the reality 
of others’ lives.30
So, narratives refocus the subject of our attention and capture 
the complexity of our lives and projects. But are stories related to 
value, according to Wallace? And if so, how? Does he accept some 
version of narrative theory? Do stories help us lead good lives 
because a life can’t go well without a story?
Wallace seems to deny that well-being requires a narrative out-
look.31 The main question to ask is this: is seeing your life as a story 
an essential part of a good life? Narrative theorists say “yes,” but 
Wallace answers “no,” and we can see this by surveying important 
passages from his Ϯction. So, Wallace rejects the weak thesis.
Brieϰy, before we work through several examples from his Ϯc-
tion, it’s worth noting a general theme raised by the examples: 
narratives increase self-awareness and so prompt us to ask our-
selves questions that tend to undermine well-being. Here are the 
kinds of questions we have in mind: Am I living up to my own idea 
of myself೒" Does my story have the virtues of good stories" Is it original, 
unique" Are there no unnecessary or dull sections" Is this a story other 
people will like" Are they interested" Does my concern with these ques-
tions really reveal that, down deep, I’m committed to this narrative for 
the wrong reasons to begin with" It’s one thing to lean back from the 
steady ϰow of the Ϯrst-person perspective, which Wallace recom-
mends, and another altogether to become hyper-self-aware in that 
way. Someone might end up feeling cramped or even tyrannized 
by thinking about one’s narrative. Indeed, Wallace more than once 
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reveals how asking these sorts of questions can undermine a per-
son’s well-being.
Turn now to some examples. Wallace holds that when someone 
thinks of her life in terms of her narrative, far from helping her 
lead a good life, it may make her feel like she has fallen short. She 
is driven to ask the kind of questions noted earlier about her moti-
vation in choosing her commitments in the Ϯrst place. The result 
is what Wallace calls the fraudulence paradox:
The fraudulence paradox was that the more time and eϸort you 
put into trying to appear impressive or attractive to other peo-
ple, the less impressive or attractive you felt inside—you were a 
fraud. And the more of a fraud you felt like, the harder you tried 
to convey an impressive or likable image of yourself so that other 
people wouldn’t Ϯnd out what a hollow, fraudulent person you 
really were.32
This way of managing appearances leaves the narrator “fright-
ened, lonely, alienated, etc.” The problem here is with one’s self-
perception. Thinking of one’s life from the point of view of a 
narrative makes one self-conscious and, in turn, interferes with 
living well.
In “The Depressed Person,” Wallace oϸered a distressing look 
at how self-awareness can literally ruin a life. The story’s main 
character is clinically depressed and fully aware of her condition. 
Her deep concern is that her depression prevents her from being 
anything more than a parasite on her friends—her “support sys-
tem.” She’d like to realize her “capacity for basic human empathy 
and compassion and caring.”33 But how can she do this when she 
is focused entirely on herself? Paradoxically, concern for her life’s 
narrative Ϯxes her gaze there. In the story, in the wake of her ther-
apist’s suicide, the depressed person realizes that she is herself 
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inappropriately self-centered. She expresses concerns about her 
self-centeredness to a terminally ill friend:
The depressed person shared that the most frightening implica-
tion of this (i.e., of the fact that, even when she centered and 
looked deep within herself, she felt she could locate no real feel-
ings for the therapist as an autonomously valid human being) 
appeared to be that all her agonized pain and despair since the 
therapist’s suicide had in fact been all and only for herself, i.e. 
for her loss, her abandonment, her grief, her trauma and pain 
and primal aϸective survival. And, the depressed person shared 
that she was taking the additional risk of revealing, even more 
frightening, that this shatteringly terrifying set of realizations, 
instead now of awakening in her any feelings of compassion, 
empathy, and other-directed grief for the therapist as a per-
son, had—and here the depressed person waited patiently for 
an episode of retching in the especially available trusted friend 
to pass so that she could take the risk of sharing this with her—
that these shatteringly frightening realizations had seemed, 
terrifyingly, merely to have brought up and created still more 
and further feelings in the depressed person about herself. At 
this point in the sharing, the depressed person took a time-out 
to solemnly swear to her long-distance, gravely ill, frequently 
retching but still caring and intimate friend that there was no 
toxic or pathetically manipulative self-excoriation here in what 
she (i.e., the depressed person) was reaching out and opening 
up and confessing, only profound and unprecedented fear: the 
depressed person was frightened for herself¬.¬.¬. she told the sup-
portive friend with the neuroblastoma. She was asking sincerely, 
the depressed person said, honestly, desperately: what kind of 
person could seem to feel nothing—“nothing,” she emphasized—
for anyone but herself?¬ .¬ .¬ . What words and terms might be 
applied to describe and assess such a solipsistic, self-consumed, 
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endless emotional vacuum and sponge as she now appeared to 
herself to be? How was she to decide and describe—even to her-
self, looking inward and facing herself—what all she’d so pain-
fully learned said about her?34
What this passage reveals—excruciatingly—is that the depressed 
person has a serious problem not only with depression, but with 
narcissism.35 The depressed person thinks that living a good life, 
for her, depends in part on whether she meets her description 
of a compassionate friend. Wallace helps us see here that narra-
tives don’t always get us “out of our own heads” in the right way. 
Instead of thinking of her terminally ill friend, the depressed per-
son wonders whether she’s doing enough to qualify as compas-
sionate. Wallace seems to use compassion to show that concern for 
narrative interferes with the realization of other-regarding virtue. 
Because the depressed person’s attention is focused on her narra-
tive and whether she’s living up to it, her eϸorts to be compassion-
ate leave her feeling even worse about herself. Any compassionate 
act pushes her even further from realizing her narrative because 
she’ll have acted to make herself qualify as compassionate, not out 
of genuine concern for another. Her narrative perspective actu-
ally makes it impossible for her to attain her ideal. The narrative 
makes her feel like a fraud and a failure.
Wallace’s Ϯction also highlights a related problem: we tend to 
overvalue uniqueness or specialness in narratives, and this leaves 
us feeling inauthentic. One popular assumption in our culture is 
that an authentic and valuable life must be characterized by spe-
cial, unusual, or even extreme commitments. We’re relentlessly 
subjected to the message that everyone is diϸerent, and so it seems 
reasonable for us to conclude that we’re living defective lives if 
we lack eccentric values. But this is to confuse uniqueness with 
authenticity. The main character in Wallace’s “Good Old Neon,” 
Neal, makes precisely that mistake.
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I spent all my time trying to get [my peers] to think I was dry 
and jaded as well.¬.¬.¬. Putting in all this time and energy to cre-
ate a certain impression and get approval or acceptance that 
then I felt nothing about because it didn’t have anything to do 
with who I really was inside, and I was disgusted with myself for 
always being such a fraud, but I couldn’t seem to help it. Here are 
some of the various things I tried: EST, riding a ten-speed to Nova 
Scotia and back, hypnosis, cocaine, sacro-cervical chiropractic, 
joining a charismatic church, jogging, pro bono work for the Ad 
Council, meditation classes, the Masons, analysis, the Landmark 
Forum, the Course in Miracles, a right-brain drawing workshop, 
celibacy, collecting and restoring vintage Corvettes, and trying to 
sleep with a diϸerent girl every night for two straight months.36
Wallace’s suggestion is that Neal felt the need to try out these 
commitments because they cast him in a certain light for the 
audience of his narrative. His commitments presented him as 
kind, cynical and world-weary, spiritually deep, emotionally dam-
aged in some interesting way, or some other mix of special traits. 
There are at least two clear problems with trying to construct a 
life narrative that is unique. First, as Wallace later has the narrator 
remark, “human beings are all pretty much identical in terms of 
our hardwiring.”37 It’s diϲcult to come up with commitments that 
make one stand out as a truly unique person. Anything that one 
person Ϯnds appealing will probably also appeal to others. Second, 
and more fundamentally, the uniqueness of a commitment is usu-
ally unrelated to its value. A painting or a cantata doesn’t become 
less beautiful as more people enjoy it. The same is true of the nar-
rative elements that might constitute a good life. The things some-
one cares about might distinguish her from others, but that’s not 
enough, by itself anyway, to make them valuable for her.
Both points Ϯnd clear expression at the conclusion of “Good Old 
Neon.” In the end, Neal begins to think that the reason he felt like 
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such a fraud, yet was hopeless to change, was that he was unable 
to love. He couldn’t let himself be happy because he couldn’t even 
love himself. Tragically, he applied the criteria for a good narra-
tive even to his diagnosis of why his life wasn’t going well, and his 
explanation proved insuϲciently unique.
I happened on part of an old Cheers episode from late in the 
series’ run where the analyst character, Frasier¬.¬.¬. , and Lilith, his 
Ϯancée and also an analyst, are just entering the stage set of the 
underground tavern, and Frasier is asking her how her workday 
at her oϲce went, and Lilith says, “If I have one more yuppie 
come in and start whining to me about how he can’t love, I’m 
going to throw up.” This line got a huge laugh from the show’s 
studio audience, which indicated that they—and so by demo-
graphic extension the whole national audience at home as well—
recognized what a cliché and melodramatic type of complaint 
the inability-to-love concept was.¬.¬.¬. The ϰash of realizing all this 
at the very same time that the huge audience-laugh showed that 
nearly everybody in the United States had probably already seen 
through the complaint’s inauthenticity as long ago as whenever 
the episode had originally run.¬.¬.¬. It more or less destroyed me, 
that’s the only way I can describe it, as if whatever hope of any 
way out of the trap I’d made for myself had been blasted out of 
midair or laughed oϸ the stage, as if I were one of those stock 
comic characters who is always both the butt of the joke and the 
only person not to get the joke.38
The sadness here is palpable. Neal has assumed a good life 
needs to be unique, though here he Ϯnds this can’t be true for his 
own life: he’s like many other people. But it shouldn’t be surpris-
ing that many people have, or think they have, the same problem. 
And of course the fact that so many people are similarly aϵicted 
does not mean it’s insigniϮcant or that they are inauthentic. 
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The wide distribution of the inability-to-love problem certainly 
doesn’t reveal that someone with this problem would be more 
authentic were it his alone. Even if the distinctiveness of a prob-
lem happened to make some person’s story more interesting to 
an audience, that would have nothing to do with whether his life 
goes well. Wallace thinks that our culture overvalues uniqueness, 
and surely he’s right.
So far, we have noted examples from Wallace’s Ϯction where 
Ϯdelity to a narrative undermines well-being. The examples are 
crucial for understanding Wallace’s attitude toward narrative 
theories.
These cases are counterexamples to the weak thesis—the claim 
that well-being requires a narrative outlook on life. To illustrate 
why, consider the narrator in “Good Old Neon.” Tear away his 
life’s circumstances from his tangled web of narrative. Here are 
the facts: Neal has a family who loves him, a knack for interesting 
work, time to devote to volunteering and hobbies, and so forth. 
This guy’s life appears on track to go well. He’s blessed. But notice 
what happens once we drop him back inside the narrative struc-
ture he has built up. There things start to fall apart for him—the 
narrativity badly screws him up. Because of his story about his 
own fraudulence and his inability to love, anything valuable in 
his life now fails to make him better oϸ. The narrative is a kind 
of poison.
Wallace wants us to see that the narrator’s Ϯdelity to his narra-
tive ruins his life. But we must not ignore a corollary: his life would 
have been a good one without the narrative. From this it seems to fol-
low that that narrative is not required for a good life. Wallace’s 
example of narrative undermining well-being casts doubt on the 
weak thesis. The important question, again: is seeing life as a story 
an essential part of a good life? Wallace sure seems to think there 
are cases where that’s not so. The same point could be made with 
the other examples as well, but let’s proceed.
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Although narrative theorists will no doubt agree that narra-
tives can undermine well-being, they may insist that’s because the 
narratives are improperly used, not because well-being doesn’t 
require a narrative outlook on life. In light of Wallace’s examples, 
then, narrative theorists might try to explain why narratives 
sometimes undermine the good life.
A Ϯrst thought is that Wallace’s examples underline problems 
people tend to encounter by using narratives as action-guiding 
plans. But using narratives in that way is a mistake. Narratives are 
not for action guidance—they are for evaluation of a life’s goodness. 
This means that a theory of the good life may be “self-eϸacing”—
that is, the good might sometimes be better promoted by ignoring 
the theory itself—but, for all that, the theory might be true. Many 
philosophers have been satisϮed with self-eϸacing theories of the 
good. Though we strongly suspect that Wallace would regard this 
as undesirable, we’ll wait for the conclusion to say more. For now, 
let’s assume that this line is closed oϸ for narrative theorists.
Here’s another thought. Defenders of narratives might try to 
avoid the problems Wallace noted by revising the weak thesis. 
They might say that narratives undermine well-being in diϲcult 
cultural conditions and insist that narratives must be endorsed 
by someone free of cultural defects. Who? A suitably idealized 
agent—that is, a fully informed or perfectly rational person. In 
other words, the narrative theorists would claim that not just 
any old narrative will do: the weak thesis must be supplemented 
with more demanding conditions for what sort of narrative can 
make a life good. Then the weak thesis is transformed as follows: 
well-being requires a narrative outlook on life that’s also endorsed by 
a suitably idealized agent. Plausibly, an idealized agent wouldn’t 
consider features like uniqueness, for instance, in developing a 
narrative. (For instance, an idealized agent wouldn’t experience 
Neal’s embarrassment and self-loathing in response to the joke on 
Cheers because those reactions are based on a mistaken concern 
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for uniqueness.) Thus, sophisticated narrative theories can avoid 
the problems arising from culture that Wallace points out.
Some of Wallace’s criticisms are indeed leveled at unhealthy 
uses of narratives that result from nonideal cultural conditions. 
But he also raises a deeper point, mentioned in passing above, that 
tells against the idea that a narrative is necessary for well-being. 
To judge one’s life in terms of narrative success is to adopt a cer-
tain perspective. This perspective involves thinking of oneself as 
a character in a story, and evaluating that character in terms of 
her or his compliance with the story’s demands. If this sounds 
alienating, there’s a good reason. It is. In fact, this very change 
in perspective gives rise to the paradox of fraudulence that Wal-
lace describes—“that the more time and eϸort you put into try-
ing to appear impressive or attractive to [an audience], the less 
impressive or attractive you felt inside.”39 The narrator in “Good 
Old Neon” describes the attitude to oneself that the narrative per-
spective calls for:
In the dream, I was in the town commons in Aurora¬ .¬ .¬ . and 
what I’m doing in the dream is sculpting an enormous marble or 
granite statue of myself¬ .¬ .¬ . and when the statue’s Ϯnally done 
I put it up on a big bandstand or platform and spend all my time 
polishing it and keeping birds from sitting on it or doing their 
business on it, and cleaning up litter and keeping the grass neat 
all around the bandstand. And in the dream my whole life ϰashes 
by like that, the sun and moon go back and forth across the sky 
like windshield wipers over and over, and I never seem to sleep or 
eat or take a shower¬.¬.¬. meaning I’m condemned to a whole life of 
being nothing but a sort of custodian to the statue.40
Narrative theories turn us into custodians of ideal selves. But 
that isn’t what being a human being is about, Wallace thinks. After 
Ϯnally being persuaded by the mocking laughter of the Cheers 
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studio audience that his fraudulence was inescapable, the narra-
tor, Neal, oϸers a Ϯnal diagnosis for his life’s failure: “my own basic 
problem was that at an early age I’d somehow chosen to cast my 
lot with my life’s drama’s supposed audience instead of with the 
drama itself.”41 In requiring us to side with the audience of our nar-
rative and not with ourselves, narrative theories alienate us from 
who we are and what’s good for us. We should experience our lives 
as participants instead of as spectators.
Some narrative theorists may have an interesting reply to this 
concern. Let’s suppose that our narratives don’t merely describe 
what is good for us. They constitute us. This is the stronger under-
standing of narrative theory mentioned already—a person is iden-
tical with her narrative. Christine Korsgaard has defended this 
idea and writes: “We construct ourselves from our choices, from 
our actions, from the reasons that we legislate.”42 So, narratives do 
more than set the parameters for a good life. Narratives also make 
particular persons who they are. Crucially, if that’s so, there can 
be no complaint about alienation. If you are your narrative, there’s 
no way your narrative can alienate you from yourself. There’s no 
you without it.
The strong thesis features a subtle and complicated under-
standing of the self. We’re not ultimately sure how Wallace would 
engage with the view, but there’s one passage in his writings that 
may serve as a kind of response to it.
Perhaps Wallace would reject this view of the self ’s constitu-
tion because it misconstrues what a person is. To see what we 
mean, compare the following two passages. Witness Korsgaard 
on the value of a life in which one violates the commitments of 
one’s narrative:
It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us 
that give rise to unconditional obligations. For to violate them 
is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and to no longer be 
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who you are. That is, it is to no longer be able to think of your-
self under the description under which you value yourself and 
Ϯnd your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth 
undertaking. It is to be for all practical purposes dead or worse 
than dead.43
Compare Korsgaard’s words to a striking passage from “Good 
Old Neon.” Wallace is here speaking to the narrator about the 
narrator’s decision to commit suicide, his decision to escape the 
essential fraudulence that comes with failing to achieve the goals 
of his various narratives (or even to settle on a single narrative). 
Wallace addresses the postmortem Neal:
You already know the diϸerence between the size and speed of 
everything that ϰashes through you and the tiny inadequate bit 
of it all you can ever let anyone know. As though inside you is 
this enormous room full of what seems like everything in the 
whole universe at one time or another and yet the only parts 
that get out have to somehow squeeze out through one of those 
tiny keyholes you see under the knob in older doors. As if we 
are all trying to see each other through these tiny keyholes.¬.¬.¬. 
What exactly do you think you are? The millions and trillions of 
thoughts, memories, juxtapositions¬.¬ .¬ . that ϰash through your 
head and disappear? Some sum or remainder of these? Your 
history?¬ .¬ .¬ . The truth is you’ve already heard this. That this is 
what it’s like. That it’s what makes room for the universes inside 
you, all the endless inbent fractals of connection and sympho-
nies of diϸerent voices, the inϮnities you can never show another 
soul. And you think it makes you a fraud, the tiny fraction anyone 
else ever sees? Of course you’re a fraud, of course what people see 
is never you. And of course you know this, and of course you try 
to manage what part they see if you know it’s only a part. Who 
wouldn’t? It’s called free will, Sherlock. But at the same time it’s 
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why it feels so good to break down and cry in front of others, or 
to laugh, or speak in tongues, or chant in Bengali—it’s not English 
anymore, it’s not getting squeezed through any hole. So cry all 
you want, I won’t tell anybody. But it wouldn’t have made you a 
fraud to change your mind. It would be sad to do it because you 
think you somehow have to.44
Here’s the philosophical point: we are not merely our narratives, 
Wallace would say, because no narrative—perhaps nothing ever 
explicitly thought in words—can capture who we are. Although 
narratives can usefully express to others and to ourselves what we 
care about, they are never who we are. Selves are ineϸable.45
Korsgaard tells us that people who don’t live up to their nar-
ratives haven’t merely let themselves down—they have chosen a 
life that amounts to being “dead or worse than dead.” Neal tells 
himself a story according to which he’s a fraud, and thinks suicide 
is his only nonfraudulent option. Wallace appreciates the sadness 
in this—killing yourself for the sake of your narrative. Which pas-
sage, Korsgaard’s or Wallace’s, sounds more humane?
CONCLUSION
Wallace reϰected on human well-being through his Ϯction and 
he oϸered real insights. Here are three. He contends, against 
the ironist, that our lives should be about something, and that 
we should not be embarrassed to say so and sincerely mean it. 
He argues compellingly that a life need not be unique or unusual 
to be valuable. And he oϸers reasons to reject the idea that well-
being comes solely from pleasure.
Our discussion has been limited to theories on which people 
construct value, rather than discover it, because of Wallace’s 
apparent preference for such views. But what would he think of 
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so-called objective list theories of the good life? Those theories say 
that certain things—say, relationships and attaining signiϮcant 
knowledge—make our lives go well independently of our thoughts 
or preferences about them. On the one hand, Wallace might think 
that these views are guilty of the moralizing he means to avoid.46 
On the other hand, recall Wallace’s admiration for Dostoevsky’s 
courage in sticking his neck out and creating meaning.47 So, we 
wonder: doesn’t it require  even greater courage to say that values 
are really out there, no matter what anyone thinks or feels, than it 
does to say they exist as a product of our constructive activity? We 
don’t know how Wallace comes down on this issue. Perhaps he’d 
take an intermediate view, on which we construct value without 
always realizing it, and we gradually discover it within ourselves, 
often Ϯnding that it’s at odds with our more conscious self-
conceptions. Perhaps value is one part of “the universes inside 
you” that’s ineϸable, inexpressible.
We Ϯnd in Wallace’s writing more than piecemeal criticism of 
other views and a glimpse of bits and pieces of his own. We also 
Ϯnd a humane recommendation about how to approach reϰec-
tion on the good life. It’s a sort of Wittgensteinian methodology, 
for lack of a better term. Wallace’s interest in Wittgenstein has 
been well documented.48 Wittgenstein famously remarked in Philo-
sophical Investigations: “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitch-
ment of our intelligence by means of language.”49 Wallace sees 
this as a dictum about the point of thinking and about the role 
of theories in thinking well. Thinking is supposed to solve prob-
lems. Thinking about what makes your life go well should not 
make you worse oϸ.50
But some theories do precisely that. If we regard some version 
of narrative theory as action guiding—if we treat it as a practical 
guide that gives us reasons to act—then our lives will may go poorly, 
even by that theory’s lights. As Wallace shows, concern about how 
one’s life appears to an audience interferes with living a good life. 
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Leading a good life calls for a level of involvement with the action 
that’s precluded by too much self-awareness. Some theorists have 
said that their views are self-eϸacing, as we noted above. Their 
theories set out standards for evaluating lives, not guides for how 
to live. If we look to such theories to provide motives for acting, 
our lives go poorly.
One standard complaint with particular moral theories is that 
they’re self-eϸacing. Wallace sees the problem as being more 
widespread—it’s endemic to theories of the good life. The ingre-
dients for human well-being are too subtle to be represented in a 
theory or, indeed, in language. Attempts to theorize about value 
result in partial and distorted vision. An important metaphor from 
“Good Old Neon” is instructive on Wallace’s view, we think:
The ground fog tends to get more intense by the second until 
it seems that the whole world is just what’s in your headlights’ 
reach. High beams don’t work in fog, they only make things 
worse. You can go ahead and try them but you’ll see what hap-
pens, all they do is light up the fog so it seems even denser. That’s 
kind of a minor paradox, that sometimes you can actually see far-
ther with low beams than high.51
All of us sometimes get confused about what would be good 
for us, about what matters, or about what matters most. Theo-
ries refocus our attention and oϸer answers. Sometimes, we need 
a helping hand: our natural inclinations are imperfect guides to 
what matters in life. But following theories is risky. Theories rede-
scribe values so they’ll Ϯt within theories—or, sometimes worse, 
theories explain particular values away entirely. They turn simple 
matters, ones we could see through perfectly Ϯne, into intellectual 
perplexities. We can Ϯgure out some things—like the value of rela-
tionships or the proper expression of compassion—better without 
theories. None of this means that theories of the good life are bad 
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or useless. They just need to be kept in their place. We need to 
recognize what such theories are for.
So what are they for? One proposal, borrowed from David 
Schmidtz, is that theories are best understood as maps: “A map 
is not itself the reality,” writes Schmidtz. “It is at best a service-
able representation. Moral theories likewise are more or less 
serviceable representations of a terrain. They cannot be more 
than that.”52 Diϸerent problems call for diϸerent maps, and we 
know that a map won’t tell us everything. It shouldn’t, either. 
A map that details everything about its subject is useless, in part 
because we don’t need the map to represent everything, and we 
can’t use everything anyhow. Maps are only helpful when we 
need to know the way. They sometimes work as stand-ins for 
practical wisdom about the local terrain. But they are never good 
when treated as full-scale reproductions of the world.
With these points in mind, notice that Wallace can answer the 
claim that a theory might be true but self-eϸacing: it’s not much 
of a theory if it can’t tell us how to go somewhere we need to go. 
Determining whether or not a life was good, after the fact, is usu-
ally not a genuine human problem. A theory that could oϸer us the 
correct answer to that question would be an intellectual achieve-
ment, to be sure, but Wallace sees it as little else. The point of 
thinking is to solve problems that matter to us, not to be clever for 
cleverness’s sake.
Kurt Baier once complained that “moral talk is often rather 
repugnant. Leveling moral accusations, expressing moral indigna-
tion, passing moral judgment, allotting the blame, administering 
moral reproof, justifying oneself, and, above all, moralizing—who 
can enjoy such talk?”53 When we talk about or apply a moral 
view, it might seem judgmental or cruel to others. But there is 
another way a moral theory might be cruel. Wallace recognizes 
that theories of the good life, when taken to be more than limited 
sketches of reality, tend to result in our being judgmental or cruel 
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to ourselves. Our pursuit of good in life is about something else 
entirely, thinks Wallace:
If you can think of times in your life that you’ve treated people 
with extraordinary decency and love, and pure uninterested 
concern, just because they were valuable as human beings. The 
ability to do that with ourselves. To treat ourselves the way we 
would treat a really good, precious friend. Or a tiny child of ours 
that we absolutely loved more than life itself. And I think it’s 
probably possible to achieve that. I think part of the job we’re 
here for is to learn how to do this.54
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